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46 PERB H3025 
B/R 44-4566
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
-and- CASE NO. U-27887
CITY OF SCHENECTADY,
Respondent.
CITY OF SCHENECTADY,
Charging Party,
-and- CASE NO. U-27980
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O’SHEA (MICHAEL P. RAVALLI of counsel), 
for Schenectady Police Benevolent Association
GIRVIN & FERLAZZO, P.C. (JAMES E. GIRVIN and CHRISTOPHER P. 
LANGLOIS of counsel), for City of Schenectady
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These cases come to the Board on exceptions by the City of Schenectady (City) to 
a decision by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with respect to an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by the Schenectady Police Benevolent Association (PBA) 
(Case No. U-27887) and an improper practice charge filed by the City (Case No.
Case Nos. U-27887 & U-27980 - 2 -
U-27890).1 In Case No. U-27887, the PBA alleges that the City violated §§209-a.1(d) and 
(e) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it announced it would no 
longer apply the disciplinary procedures in Article VIII of the parties’ expired collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement) and Civ Serv Law §75, and when it unilaterally issued 
General Order 0-43 outlining a new disciplinary procedure for PBA unit members. The 
City alleges in Case No. U-27890 that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act when it 
submitted proposals relating to police discipline for consideration by a public arbitration 
panel on the ground that certain provisions of the Second Class Cities Law render the 
subject matter a prohibited subject of negotiations under the Act.
Forgoing presentation of witnesses at a hearing, the parties submitted the case to 
the ALJ on stipulated facts, along with a five volume stipulated record containing joint 
exhibits, PBA exhibits and City exhibits. Following consideration of the record, and the 
parties’ respective legal arguments, the ALJ issued a decision sustaining PBA’s charge 
that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act, and dismissing the City’s charge. In reaching 
his decision, however, the ALJ did not address PBA’s allegation that the City’s conduct 
also violated §209-a. 1 (e) of the Act.2
EXCEPTIONS
In its exceptions, the City contends that the ALJ erred in sustaining PBA’s charge 
and dismissing its charge because the subject of police discipline is a prohibited subject 
of negotiations based upon Second Class Cities Law, Article 9 and the Court of_________
1 44 PERB 1J4566 (2011). Following the ALJ’s decision, the parties were granted over a 
dozen extensions on consent to file exceptions and responses. In addition, the Board 
granted the parties additional extensions to brief the relevancy of the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Matter of Town ofWallkill v CSEA, 19 NY3d 1066, 45 PERB 1J7508 (2012) to 
their respective arguments. The need for the requested extensions reflects the 
complexity of the legal issues presented.
2 44 PERB H4566 at 4741, n. 96.
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Appeals’ decisions in Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New 
York, Inc, v New York State Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter,
NYCPBAf and Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Service Employees Association, Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO4 (hereinafter Wallkill). According to the City, police discipline 
is a prohibited subject because the Second Class Cities Law, Article 9 commits police 
disciplinary authority to City officials and that law pre-dates the enactment of Civ Serv 
Law §§75 and 76. Furthermore, it asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to determine 
whether the Second Class Cities Law, Article 9 governs police discipline in the City and 
whether NYCPBA is applicable to a general law such as the Second Class Cities Law. 
Finally, it challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that the Act is a superseding law under 
Second Class Cities Law, §4 following our decision in City of Albany.3 45
PBA supports the ALJ’s decision finding that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Act, and dismissing the City’s charge. It asserts that the ALJ correctly concluded that 
the Act constitutes a superseding law pursuant to Second Class Cities Law, §4. In the 
alternative, it contends that the Second Class Cities Law was superseded when the City
adopted a structure of government pursuant to the Optional City Government Law,6 and
/ ' ,
3 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB H7006 (2006).
4 Supra note 1.
5 42 PERB H3005 (2009).________^_____________ ■ ____________ _________
6 L 1914, c 444. Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 18.The Optional City Government Law 
was repealed in 1939. L 1939, c 765. The legislation provided, however, that an 
adopted plan by a city prior to January 1,1940 “will be in force in whole or in part, in 
such city, such plan and all portions of said statute applicable to said plan are hereby 
continued in full force and to the same effect as to such city until repealed or 
superseded by a local law enacted pursuant to the city home rule law. L 1939, c 765,
§1. Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 20.
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when the Legislature enacted Unconsolidated Law §891.7 It also asserts that City 
police officers are subject to discipline under Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76, and that 
alternatives to those procedures are mandatorily negotiable under the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Auburn Police Local 195 v Helsby (hereinafter Auburn).8
FACTS
The City and the PBA were parties to a negotiated agreement for the period
January 1, 1969-December 31, 1970, which included an article entitled “Disciplinary 
Action” that stated:
A. In the event that an investigation results in the institution of 
disciplinary action, the Association shall be free to participate at 
all stages of the proceedings if it so elects, and shall be 
provided with copies of the charges and specifications, 
recommendations, and decisions.
B. In the event the Association concludes that an employee has 
been unjustly punished or dismissed by the City Manager, it 
may appeal such judgment to arbitration as provided below.
The Board of Arbitrators shall review the justness of the 
punishment imposed, upon the record made before the hearing 
officer.
C. No new testimony or evidence shall be received by the Board of
7 L 1940, c 834.
8 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB1J7006 (1979). We deny the PBA’s request in its response 
that we determine its allegation that the City’s actions also violated §209-a.1 (e) of the 
Act, which the ALJ declined to rule on. Under §213.3 of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules), a party that receives exceptions from an ALJ’s decision has the right to serve 
and file a.response and/or cross-exceptions within the stated timeframe. In the present 
case, the PBA did not file cross-exceptions to the ALJ’s declination to rule on the
allegation that the City’s conduct violated §209-a.1 (e) of the Act. By failing to file cross­
exceptions with respect to that issue, it has not been preserved. Rules, §213.2(b)(4); 
Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), confirmed sub nom. Matter of Town of 
Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 1J7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 
2007); County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB ]|3006 (2008); Town of 
Wallkill, 42 PERB H3006 (2009).
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Arbitrators. If the Board of Arbitrators decides that new evidence 
or testimony should be heard, it shall refer the case back to the 
City Manager. If the Board of Arbitrators decides that the 
determination was erroneous or that the punishment imposed 
was unduly harsh or severe under all the circumstances, it may 
modify the finding and punishment accordingly. Nothing herein 
contained shall be deemed to limit thd rights of the employee 
provided for in Article 5 of the Civil Service Law.9
Over the next three decades, the parties entered into a series of successor 
agreements that included slight modifications to the disciplinary article. The negotiated 
disciplinary provisions, however, have remained essentially unchanged since 1969.10
The PBA and the City are parties to an expired agreement for the period January 
1, 1997-December 31, 1999.11 The parties have stipulated that the terms of the expired 
agreement remain in effect pursuant to §209~a.1(e) of the Act.12 The disciplinary article 
of that agreement states:
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
A. In the event that an investigation results in the institution of 
disciplinary action, the Association shall be free to participate 
at all stages of the proceedings if it so elects, and shall be 
provided with copies of the charges and specifications, 
recommendations, and decisions.
B. In the event the Association concludes that an employee has 
been unjustly punished or dismissed by the Mayor, it may 
appeal such judgment to arbitration as provided below. The 
Arbitrator shall review the justness of the punishment imposed, 
upon the record made before the hearing officer. Either party 
shall be entitled to file briefs with the Arbitrator.
9 Stipulated Record, PBA Exhibit 1.
10 Stipulated Facts, 1|7, PBA Exhibits 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 14; Stipulated Record, Joint 
Exhibit 8.
11 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 8.
12 Stipulated Facts, H4.
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C. No new testimony or evidence shall be received by the 
Arbitrator. If the Arbitrator decides that new evidence or 
testimony should be heard, he shall refer the case back to the 
Mayor. If the Arbitrator decides that the determination was 
erroneous or that the punishment imposed was unduly harsh 
or severe under all the circumstances, he may modify the 
finding and punishment accordingly. Nothing herein contained 
shall be deemed to limit the rights of the employee provided for 
in Article 5 of the Civil Service Law.13
Since the expiration of the January 1, 1997-December 31, 1999 agreement, the 
City and PBA have been parties to an interest arbitration for the period January 1, 2000 
December 31, 2001, a memorandum of agreement for the period January 1,2002- 
December 31, 2005, and an interest arbitration award for the period January 1, 2006- 
December 31, 2007.14 15
During'the course of negotiations between the parties in 2000 and 2002, the City 
was unsuccessful in persuading PBA to agree to modify the disciplinary article through 
inclusion of the following:
All members of the bargaining unit shall only be disciplined 
in accordance with Sections 75 and 76 of the New York
State Civil Service Law. 15
Between 1969 and its unilateral action in 2007, the City issued disciplinary 
charges against PBA unit employees and imposed discipline pursuant to Civ Serv Law 
§75 and the disciplinary article of the parties’ agreements.16 Disciplinary hearings were 
conducted by individuals designated by the City and the City issued disciplinary
13 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 8, R. 40-41.
14 Stipulated Facts, 1J3; Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibits 8, 9 and 10.
15 Stipulated Record, PBA Exhibits 24-A and 24-B.
16 Stipulated Facts, ffl|10, 12; Stipulated Record, PBA Exhibits 17, 19 and 20.
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determinations pursuant to Civ Serv Law §75.17 During the same period, a City 
disciplinary determination was challenged through the filing of a demand for arbitration 
and the submission of the issues to an arbitrator consistent with the negotiated 
disciplinary article.18
In a press release dated June 4, 2007, the City unilaterally announced the 
implementation of significant changes in police disciplinary procedures based upon the 
Court of Appeals’ decision in NYCPBA,19 Those changes included replacing the 
negotiated disciplinary procedures for PBA unit employees and designating the Public 
Safety Commissioner as the trier of fact with the authority to issue final disciplinary 
determinations on behalf of the City, which would be subject to judicial review.
In the most recent round of negotiations, the PBA proposed replacing the 
disciplinary article of the expired agreement with a new set of disciplinary provisions.20 
Under the PBA proposals, the City would need just cause to discipline a unit employee 
and an arbitrator would determine the employee’s guilt or innocence and the 
appropriateness of the City’s proposed penalty. Following an impasse in their 
negotiations, the PBA filed a petition for interest arbitration on November 2, 2007.21
On November 30, 2007, the City issued its first notice of discipline against a PBA 
unit member premised upon Second Class Cities Law, §137 and the City of
18 Stipulated Facts, 1|14; Stipulated Record, PBA Exhibits 21 and 22.
19 Stipulated Record, R.19.
20 Stipulated Facts, 1J20; Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 3.
21 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 1, fl5; Joint Exhibit 2 ,1|5.
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Schenectady Charter, §C4-1(C).22 On April 4, 2008, the City imposed Police 
Department General Order 0-43, which stated that all disciplinary proceedings against 
sworn police officers would be subject to Second Class Cities Law, §137. In addition, 
General Order 0-43 outlined new procedures for the investigation and determination of 
alleged acts of misconduct and incompetence by police personnel.23 It is undisputed 
that the City imposed the changes to the police disciplinary procedure without 
negotiations with the PBA 24
DISCUSSION
We begin with the legal issues presented by the City in its exceptions, and the 
PBA in its response, concerning whether the subject of discipline of PBA unit members 
is a prohibited subject of negotiations under NYCPBA and Wallkill. To determine that 
issue requires an examination of state and local legislative history external to the Act to 
determine whether the subject of disciplinary procedures for City police officers is a 
prohibited subject of negotiations. The City contends that the Second Class Cities Law, 
Article 9 is a law, which under the Court of Appeals’ decisions in NYCPBA and Wallkill, 
demonstrates a New York public policy concerning police discipline that outweighs any 
obligation under §209-a.1 (d) of the Act to negotiate the subject with the PBA. In its 
response, the PBA asserts that the Second Class Cities Law has been superseded by 
the Act as well as subsequent state and local legislation.
In NYCPBA, the Court found certain special state laws enacted prior to Civ Serv 
Law §§75 and 76 granting police disciplinary authority to local officials demonstrated a
22 Stipulated Facts, H17, Stipulated Record, PBA Exhibit 23.
23 Stipulated Record, R.20-22.
24 Stipulated Facts, Tf'18.
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state public policy favoring strong disciplinary authority over police officers that 
outweighs New York's strong and sweeping policy supporting collective negotiations 
under the Act. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Auburn25 that where 
Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 disciplinary procedures are applicable to police officers, a 
proposal to negotiate a grievance/arbitration provision for police discipline is a 
mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act.
In l/Va/M/, the Court concluded that a general law, Town Law §155, which 
commits police disciplinary authority to local officials and pre-dates Civ Serv Law §§75 
and 76, prohibits negotiations concerning police discipline in localities covered by that 
general law.25 6 In reaching its decision in Wallkill, the Court implicitly rejected our 
analysis of the text and legislative history of the Act directly related to the negotiability of 
police disciplinary procedures delineated in our related decision,27 and presented to the 
Court in our amicus curiae brief. In our decision and amicus curiae brief, we set forth 
the text and history of a series of enacted amendments to §209.4 of the Act that we 
believe are directly relevant to determining legislative intent concerning the negotiability
25 Supra note 8.
26 Prior to Wallkill, we had incorrectly interpreted NYCPBA as being limited to special 
laws concerning police disciplinethat had been enacted prior to Civil Service Law §§75 
and 76. See Tarrytown PBA, 40 PERB U3024 (2007); City of Albany, 42 PERB1J3005 
(2009). In light-of Wallkill, it is clear that a general law can make police discipline a 
prohibited subject of negotiations in a particular jurisdiction under the reasoning set forth 
in NYCPBA.
27 Town of Wallkill 42 PERB ^3017 (2009) confirmed sub nom. Matter of Town of 
Wallkill v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 43 PERB ^7005 (Sup Ct Albany County 
2010). See also, City of Albany, supra note 5.
Case Nos. U-27887 & U-27980 - 10 -
of police disciplinary procedures.28 In light of the Court’s decision in Wallkill, repeating 
the relevant text and applicable legislative history of the Act in this decision would be 
superfluous.
The holdings in NYCPBA and Wallkill were not premised upon the text and 
history of the Act. Instead, they were based upon pre-existing statutes concerning 
police discipline in local governments, enacted prior to the advent of public sector 
collective bargaining in New York, and Civ Serv Law §76.4, which states, in 
part,“[n]othing contained in section seventy-five or seventy-six of this chapter shall be 
construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local law or charter provision 
relating to the removal or suspension of officers or employees in the competitive class 
of the civil service of the state or any civil division.”
The enactment of Civil Service Law §76.4 was part of a 1958 recodification 
wherein the provisions of former Civ Serv Law §22 were renumbered as Civ Serv Law 
§§75 and 76.29 Although the recodification took place following issuance of an 
executive order by New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner; Jr. granting collective 
bargaining rights to municipal employees in mayoral departments and agencies, the 
1958 legislation did not address the issue of negotiations.30
The language from Civ Serv Law §76.4 relied upon in NYCPBA and Wallkill 
derives from former Civ Serv Law §22.3, which was added in 1941 by legislation that
28 See L?9957c 432; L 1995, c 447; L 2001, c 586; L 2002, c 22oTl 2002, c 232; L 
2003, c 641; L 2003, c 696; L 2004, c 63; L 2005, c 737; L 2007, c 190; L 2008, c 179; L 
2008, c 234; §§209.4(e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the Act.
29 L 1958, c 790.
30 See Exec Order. No 49 (Mar. 31, 1958), reprinted in Labor Relations Program for 
Employees of the City of New York, 12 Indus. & Lab Rel Rev 371,618-25 (1959).
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extended to all competitive class employees working for the “state, or any civil division 
or city thereof,” the identical procedural protections against discipline in public 
employment that previously existed only for employees who were honorably discharged 
veterans and volunteer firefighters.31
In 1941, former Civ Serv Law §22.3 stated:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal or
-------------- modify any general or special law relating to the removal or
suspension of officers or employees in the competitive class 
of the civil service.32
The existence of Civ Serv Law §22.3 prior to the 1958 recodification raises an 
unresolved issue regarding the precise chronological borderline intended by the Court in 
NYCPBA and Wallkill in determining police discipline negotiability. The precise location 
of that borderline is further complicated by the fact that police officers who are 
honorably discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters have been entitled to Civ Serv 
Law disciplinary procedures since 1909, well before the enactment of many general and 
special police disciplinary laws. The role that this century-old public policy choice, 
restricting the right of local governments to discipline police officers who are honorably 
discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters, should play in determining negotiability
31 L 1941, c 853. The grant of procedural protections against discharge and discipline 
of veterans and volunteer firefighters was first enacted as part of the Civil Service Law 
of 1909, L 1909, c 15. In 1924, the Legislature granted competitive class employees a 
right to written disciplinary notice and the opportunity to respond in writing. L 1924, c 
612.
32 L 1941, c 853, §§1and 3.
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of police discipline under the Act was not addressed in NYCPBA and Wallkill. 33
Another general law applicable to police discipline in existence at the time of the
1941 amendment to Civ Serv Law §22.3 is Unconsolidated Law §891, which states:
A policeman serving in the competitive class of civil service 
in any city, county, town or village of the state, any provision 
of law, rule or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, 
shall not be removed from his position except for 
incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing upon 
due notice upon stated charges, and with the right to such- 
policeman to be represented by counsel at such hearing and 
to a judicial review in accordance with the provisions of 
article seventy-eight of the civil practice act. The burden of 
proving incompetency or misconduct shall be upon the 
person alleging the same. Hearings upon charges pursuant 
to this act shall be held by the officer or body having the 
power to remove the person charged with incompetency or 
misconduct or by a deputy or other employee of such officer 
or body designated in writing for that purpose. In case a 
deputy or other employee is so designated, he shall, for the 
purpose of such hearing, be vested with all the powers of . 
such officer or body, and shall make a record of such 
hearing which shall, with his recommendations, be referred 
to such officer or body for review and decision.34 (Emphasis 
added).
A third law that pre-dates the amendment to former Civ Serv Law §22.3 is the 
Second Class Cities Law, enacted in 190635 and amended in 1909.36 The Second 
Class Cities Law grants police disciplinary authority to the Commissioner of Public
33 Nevertheless, in City of Middletown, 42 PERB U3022 (2009), reversed sub nom. 
Matter of City of Middletown v City of Middletown PBA, 43 PERB U7002 (Sup Ct, Albany 
County 2010), 81 AD3d 1238, 44 PERB 117003 (3d Dept 2011) the Appellate Division,
Third Department rejected our analysis that negotiations to replace Civ Serv Law §75
disciplinary procedures for honorably discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters in a 
unit of municipal police officers were mandatorily negotiable.
34 L 1940, c 834.
35 L 1906, c 473.
36 L 1909, c 55, Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 15.
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Safety of a city of the second class. Those powers include the power to adopt and 
enforce police departmental rules, to hold hearings and determine disciplinary charges 
against police officers, and to impose punishments.37 The law also codifies a judicial 
appeal procedure from disciplinary determinations by a Commissioner of Public Safety 
substantially at variance with the appeal procedure set forth in Civ Serv Law §§76.1-
76.3.38 ____  ...............
The City contends in the present case that it did not violate §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
because it had a right to unilaterally revert to the provisions of the Second Class Cities 
Law, which the City asserts meets the criteria under NYCPBA and WallkilMor rendering 
the subject of police disciplinary procedures a prohibited subject of negotiations: the law 
grants police disciplinary authority to City officials and it pre-dates the enactment of Civ 
Serv Law §§75 and 76. While we agree with the City that the Second Class Cities Law
i
is a general law subject to Civ Serv Law §76.4 and former Civ Serv Law §22.3, we are 
not persuaded that the Second Class Cities Law renders police discipline a prohibited 
subject under the Act.
_____ A. The Second Class Cities Law Has Been Superseded by the Act------------------
Second Class Cities Law §4 states:
A provision of this chapter shall apply, according to its term, 
only to a city of the state which on the thirty-first day of 
December, nineteen hundred and twenty-three was a city of 
the second class, until such provision is superseded
___________pursuanttoJhemunicipalhome-rule-law-was- superseded—
pursuant to the former city home rule law or is or was 
otherwise changed, repealed or superseded pursuant to law.
(Emphasis added).
37 Second Class Cities law §§2, 131, 137.
38 Second Class Cities Law, §138.
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In City of Albany,39 we concluded that the enactment of the Act in 1967 and its 
subsequent amendments superseded the Second Class Cities Law by requiring police 
discipline to be subject to collective negotiations and the impasse procedures under the 
Act. Fundamentally, the mandate of §204.1 of the Act requiring an employer to 
negotiate with an employee organization over terms and conditions of employment is 
inconsistent with the power and unilateral authority granted the Commissioner of Public 
Safety under the Second Class Cities Law.40
We are not persuaded by the City’s argument that we should reverse City of 
Albany based upon NYCPBA and Wallkill. Neither NYCPBA nor Wallkill presented the 
Court with a pre-existing law with a broad supersession provision or a law, as the City 
argues, granting a City police officer “greater protection” against discipline than under 
the Civil Service Law.41 Furthermore, in the City of Albany, which is a city of the second 
class,42 and where Civ Serv Law §75 is the applicable disciplinary procedure 43 police 
discipline has been found to be mandatorily negotiable under the Act.44 Police
39 Supra note 5.
40 See Duci v Roberts, 65 AD2d 56 (3d Dept 1978).
41 Supplemental Brief in Support of the Exceptions filed by the City of Schenectady, p. 
24.
42 People ex rel Folk v McNulty, 279 NY 563 (1939).
43 See Matter of Marsh v Han/ey, 50 AD2d 687 (3d Dept i975y, Matterof DeMarco v
City of Albany, 75 AD2d 674 (3d Dept 1980).
44 City of Albany, 9 PERB 1J3009 (1976), confirmed sub nom., City o f Albany v Helsby 
56 AD2d 976, 10 PERB fi7006 (3d Dept 1977); City of Albany, 7 PERB H3078 (1974), 7 
PERB H3079 (1974), confirmed sub nom., City of Albany v Helsby, 48 AD2d 998, 8 
PERB U7012 (3d Dept 1975), affd 38 NY2d 778, 9 PERB H7005 (1975). See also, De 
Paulo v City of Albany, 49 NY2d 994 (1980)(rejecting the City of Albany’s effort to 
vacate a police disciplinary arbitrator’s decision and award on public policy grounds).
- 15-
discipline in the City of Troy was also once subject to the Second Class Cities Law,45 
and is now subject to Civ Serv Law §75 procedures.46
In its brief, the City does not direct us to any relevant authority for interpreting the 
phrase “or otherwise changed, repealed superseded pursuant to law” in Second Class 
Cities Law §4. The wording of that phrase demonstrates that “superseded” was 
intended to mean something other than “changed” or “repealed” and it anticipated 
supersession by state and local laws. Simply stated, the text of Second Class Cities 
Law §4 reveals a statutorily planned obsolescence for that law resulting from 
subsequent enactment of state or local legislation. Finally, we note that adoption of the 
City’s argument would require us to treat as a nullity decades-old judicial precedent 
under the Act finding that police discipline in a second class city is a mandatory subject, 
a result we cannot reach without a contrary judicial interpretation of the interplay 
between the Second Class Cities Law §4 and the Act.
B. The Applicability of Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 to PBA Unit Members 
The subject of police discipline might also be mandatorily negotiable under 
Auburn because Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 appear applicable to PBA unit members 
based upon the City’s prior adoption of a form of government under the Optional City 
Government Law47 and precedent from the Appellate Division, Third Department.
The Optional City Government Law granted a second class city the choice of
Case Nos. U-27887 & U-27980
45 In re O'Rourke, 254 AD 917 (3d Dept 1938).
46 City of Troy v Troy Police Benev and Protective Assn, 78 AD2d 925 (3d Dept 1980); 
Nuttall v City of Troy, 99 AD2d 916 (3d Dept 1984).
47 Stipulated Facts, 1J27; L 1914, c 444, Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 18.
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adopting as its charter one of seven plans of local government structure.48 In 1934, the
City adopted, effective January 1, 1936, a form of city government known as Plan C
under the Optional City Government Law.49 The legal effect of the City’s adoption of
Plan C was that the plan became the City’s new charter.50 Optional City Government
Law §46, which is applicable to a City that adopts Plan C,51 states:
Civil Service. All appointments, promotions, removals and 
changes in status in the civil service of the city shall be made 
in accordance with the provisions of the civil service law.
The Legislative employees of the city shall be the city clerk 
and the sergeant-at-arms of the council.
In Matter of Mountain v City of Schenectady (Mountain),52 the court concluded 
that a City police officer’s entitlement to back wages was subject to the limitation set 
forth in Civ Serv Law §75.3 after the City’s disciplinary action under that statute was 
judicially vacated on the merits.53 The court’s holding in Mountain strongly suggests 
that Civ Serv Law §75, and not the Second Class Cities Law, is applicable to the City’s 
police force. Although firefighters, like police officers, are also subject to the Second
48 Johnson v Etkin, 279 NY 1 (1938).
49 Stipulated Facts,H27; L 1914, c 444, Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 18._________
50 Cleveland v City of Watertown, 222 NY 159 (1917).
51 See Matter of Cary v Council of City of Binghamton, 290 NY 247 (1943)(harmonizing 
Optional Government Law §47 and the Civil Service Law concerning the removal of city 
civil service commissioners).
52 100 AD2d 718 (3d Dept 1984), app c//sm/ssed63 NY2d 603 ('\984),lvappdismissed, 
63 NY2d 769 (1984), app denied, 64 NY2d 607 (1985).
53 Cf. Matter of Doe v City of Schenectady, 84 AD3d 1455 (3d Dept 2011) (where the 
Appellate Division, Third Department stated in dicta “[ijndeed, the City of Schenectady 
already has the right to conduct public police disciplinary hearings under Second Class 
Cities Law 1J137.”). We are not able to harmonize that sentence with the decision in 
Matter of Mountain v City of Schenectady, supra note 52, because Second Class Cities 
Law 1f137 does not include a back pay provision.
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Class Cities Law §137, the same court in Matter of Thomas v City of Schenectady 
(Thomas)54 sustained Civ Serv Law §75 misconduct charges against a City firefighter 
but found that he was entitled to back pay for the period of his suspension that 
exceeded 30 days, the maximum pre-determination suspension permitted under Civ 
Serv Law §75.3. Our tentative conclusion that Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 are applicable 
to PBA unit members is tempered by earlier appellate precedent applying Second Class 
Cities Law §§137 and 138 to City police discipline.55 Those decisions, however, pre­
date the Legislature’s grant to us of improper practice jurisdiction under the Act.56
We note that the parties’ agreements and practices since 1969 indicate their 
understanding that Civ Serv Law §75 applies to the discipline of City police officers. 
Their agreements have consistently stated that PBA unit members have rights “provided 
for in Article 5 of the Civil Service Law” which includes Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76, and 
the City has consistently followed those procedures and the disciplinary article of the 
agreements when disciplining PBA unit members prior to the City’s unilateral action in 
the present case. Nevertheless, an arguably decades-old mutual legal mistake by the 
parties is not binding upon us or the courts. 57
54 161 AD2d 940 (3d Dept 1990).
55 See Matter of Stisser v Roan, 26 AD2d 199 (3d Dept 1966) affirmed Matter of Stisser 
v. Shapiro 23 NY2d 715 (1968); Matter of Semerad v City of Schenectady, 27 AD2d 
673 (3d Dept 1967); In re Caputo, 3 AD2d 484 (3d Dept 1957). See also, Matter of Doe
v. City o f Schenectady, supra note 55 (where the Appellate Division stated .in. d/cfa___
“[ijndeed, the City of Schenectady already has the right to conduct public police 
disciplinary hearings under Second Class Cities Law §137.”); In re Skinkle, 249 NY M2 
(1928)(hoIding that Second Class Cities Law §138 is the sole mechanism for judicial 
review of police discipline in a second class city, which excludes a certiorari review).
56 L 1969, c 24, §3.
57 City of Middletown, supra note 33.
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A final determination concerning whether Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 is applicable 
to the entire PBA unitwill have to await judicial clarification of the relationship between 
the Second Class Cities Law §§137 and 138 and Optional City Government Law §46, 
and judicial harmonization of appellate precedent concerning the statutory disciplinary 
procedures applicable to the City police force.
C. Supersession of the Second Class Cities Law by Other Laws
Next, we turn to the PBA’s alternative arguments that the Second Class Cities 
Law was superseded by other laws. Our analysis starts with the PBA’s reliance upon 
Unconsolidated Law §891. The primary purpose of Unconsolidated Law §891 was to 
ensure uniformity regarding police discipline in all cities, counties, towns and villages.
In Matter of Healey v Bazinet (Bazinet)58 the Court of Appeals held that the law 
superseded the police disciplinary provisions of the City of Glens Falls charter, enacted 
by the Legislature in 1908.59
The legislative history of Unconsolidated Law §891 reveals that it was introduced 
at the request of the New York State Police Conference for the purpose of creating a 
uniform police disciplinary system for the entire State.60 The fact that a police officer 
employee organization spearheaded legislation to protect its members against discipline 
was not unique. Prior to the enactment of the Act, employee associations “sought to
58 291 NY 430 (1943).
59 L 1908, c 29.
60 Mem. of Nathan R. Sobel., Bill Jacket, L 1940, c 834, at 31-32; Mem. of New York
State Pol Conf, Bill Jacket at 24-27. ,
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protect and improve the status of their members primarily through legislation.... ”61
The bill was signed into law by Governor Lehman despite the recommendation of 
his Counsel, Nathan R. Sobel, that it be vetoed. Mr. Sobers memorandum stated, in 
part: .
Although I believe that there is a great distinction between 
policemen and other civil service employees, I nevertheless, 
recommend that the bill be vetoed. I feel that each
municipality should have the right to determine just what-------------
review the policemen is entitled to and that there is no 
urgency for a uniform law. 62
The New York State Civil Service Commission also recommended a veto 
contending that: police officers do not deserve the “special reward” of statutory 
protections against discipline that already existed only for honorably discharged 
veterans and volunteer firefighters under Civ Serv Law §22; the proper administration of 
police departments may be impaired by the undermining of discipline and efficiency; 
there are pre-existing statutes with respect to police discipline for certain city, village 
and town police departments; and “[IJocal conditions should be treated by local 
remedies and not by a general law. It is advisable to maintain this policy.”63 Employer 
organizations and others urged disapproval of the legislation because of pre-existing 
police discipline statutes for particular localities, concerns that the law would impair
61 1971-72 Report, The Joint Legislative Committee on the Taylor Law (Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act), State of New York Legislative Document (1972) -  
Number 25, p. 8.
62 Mem. of Nathan R. Sobel., Bill Jacket, L 1940, c 834, at 32.
63 Approved Mem from New York State Civ Serv Comm, L 1940, c 834, at 30.
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police discipline, and that police officers should not be granted the same procedural 
protections as veterans and firefighters.64
Based upon the Court of Appeals decision in Bazinet, and the text and legislative 
history of Unconsolidated Law §891, we would be hard pressed to conclude that the 
Second Class Cities Law was not superseded by that 1940 law or that it is not relevant 
to determining whether police discipline.is a mandatory subject between the City and 
the PBA. Such conclusions, however, would be in error because the law is equally 
applicable to police departments in all cities, counties, towns and village including those 
involved in NYCPBA,65 and Wallkill. In those decisions, the Court of Appeals did not 
discuss the text, legislative history and precedent regarding Unconsolidated Law §891 
in discerning New York public policy with respect to the negotiability of police discipline. 
Moreover, the Court implicitly overruled Bazinet by relying on special and general police 
discipline statutes that pre-date Unconsolidated Law §891 in finding that those laws 
preempted the negotiability of police discipline. Based upon the foregoing, we are 
compelled to reject the PBA’s arguments centered on Unconsolidated Law §891 until 
there is final judicial resolution of whether its text, legislative history and purpose 
demonstrate a public policy consistent with police discipline being a mandatory subject 
under the Act.
64 Mem of Conf of Mayors, Bill Jacket L 1940, c 834, at 9; Mem of Westchester Co Vill 
Officials’ Assn, Bill Jacket at 17-18; Mem ofGiv Serv Reform Assn, Bill Jacket at 19.—
65 Prior to deciding NYCPBA, the Court had ruled that Unconsolidated Law §891 is 
applicable to the New York City police force along with the police disciplinary provisions 
in the New York City Administrative Code. See Matter of Wallace v Murphy, 21 NY2d 
433 (1968); Matter of Foley v Bratton, 92 NY2d 781 (1999). The applicability of 
Unconsolidated Law §891 did not, however, affect the Court’s reasoning in NYCPBA.
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Finally, we consider the PBA’s argument that the legislative measures taken by 
the City supersede the applicability of the Second Class Cities Law. As noted, the City 
adopted a form of city government known as Plan C under the Optional City 
Government Law, effective January 1, 1936.66 Upon adoption of that plan, the laws 
regulating the powers and duties of City officers and employees continued in full force 
and effect until the City council enacted ordinances concerning those matters.67
Pursuant to Optional City Government Law, §8, such ordinances constitute a
superseding law.68 In addition, Optional City Government Law, §37 states, in part:
The council under any of the plans of government defined in 
this act as plan A, B, C, D, E or F shall, subject to the 
provisions of this act, have power to regulate by ordinance 
the exercise of any power and the performance of any duty 
by any officer or employee of the city; and upon the passing 
of any such ordinance every provision of the charter or of the 
second class cities law, applicable to such city, regulating 
the matter, or any of them, provide for in such ordinance 
shall cease to have any force or effect in such city 69 
(Emphasis added).
On January 4, 1936, the City adopted Ordinance No. 8110, expressly abolishing 
the office of Commissioner of Public Safety under the Second Class Cities Law and 
transferring the powers and duties of that office to the City Manager, subject to the 
limitations of the Optional City Government Law.70 Consistent with Optional City 
Government Law §37, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8110 rendered Second Class
66 Stipulated Facts, 1J27; L 1914, c444, Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 18._____
67 Optional City Government Law, §§8 and 37. Joint Exhibit 18, R.921,928-929.
68 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 18, R.921. See Duci v Roberts, supra note 40.
69 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 18, R.928-929.
70 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 19, R.938.
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Cities Law §§130, 131, 132, 133 and 137 inoperable but only to the extent that those 
provisions reference a Commissioner of Public Safety.71 The ordinance cannot be 
construed as invalidating or superseding the municipal police disciplinary powers 
granted under the Second Class Cities Law because those powers and duties were 
transferred to the City Manager under the ordinance. Therefore, we reject the PBA’s 
contention that the City’s adoption of the plan and the enactment of the ordinance 
adversely affected the. City’s police disciplinary powers under the Second Class Cities 
Law.72
Following a 1978 referendum adopting City Local Law No. 4 of 1978, the City’s 
charter was changed so that the office of City Manager was replaced by an elected 
Mayor, effective January 1, 1980.73 Under the charter revision, the elected Mayor was 
granted executive powers including the “power of appointment of officers and 
employees” and the power to remove “any such officer or employee.” 74 Section 4 of 
City Local No. 4 of 1978 stated:
71 See Jones v City of Binghamton, 256 AD 41 (3d Dept 1939).
72 Cf Application of Grenfell, 269 AD 600, 603-604 (3d Dept 1945), affirmed in part, 294 
NY 610 (1945), where the Appellate Division, Third Department stated: “We agree with 
the contention of proponent that despite this there is no constitutional or legislative 
prohibition against the adoption of any or all of the provisions of the Second Class Cities 
Law as a city charter, but if such provisions are to be adopted under section 19-a of the 
City Home Rule Law they must be designated specifically in the proposed local law, and 
otherwise in accordance with the statute. Mere blanket references to the Second Class
Cities Law are not sufficient. Voters are entitled to know from the language of t h e ____
proposal itself precisely what they are called to pass upon, and should not be required 
by reference to examine the provisions of any statute. The fact that the city of 
Schenectady was governed under Second Class Cities Law prior to 1934 in no way 
alters this proposition. It cannot be assumed that because of this fact the voters 
generally are familiar with all of the pertinent provisions of such statute.”
73 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 21, R.943.
74 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 21, §§90, 92, R.943.
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All provisions of L. 1914, Ch. 444 (Optional City Government 
Law) or any other law, charter provision, local law or 
ordinance not inconsistent herewith shall continue in full 
force and effect.75
While the 1978 charter revision demonstrates the continued applicability of the Optional 
City Government Law to the City’s governing structure, we find nothing in its provisions 
to demonstrate explicitly or implicitly that it was intended to supersede the police 
disciplinary powers granted under the Second Class Cities Law. We reach the same 
conclusion with respect to the subsequent local laws revising the specific City officer 
with police disciplinary authority.76
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the City’s exceptions and affirm the decision 
of the ALJ finding in Case No. U-27887 that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
when it announced it would no longer apply the negotiated disciplinary procedures in 
the parties’ expired agreement and Civ Serv Law §75, and when it unilaterally issued 
General Order 0-43 outlining a new disciplinary procedure for PBA unit members. In 
addition, we dismiss the City’s charge in Case No. U-27980.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of Schenectady will forthwith:
1. Rescind any disciplinary action initiated against PBA unit
members on or after November 30, 2007, to the extent that 
such disciplinary action was not in conformity with Article 
VIII of the parties’ agreement and Civil Service Law §75, 
and will make such PBA unit members whole including 
reinstatement with back wages and benefits with interest at 
the maximum legal rate;
2. Remove any documents from the personnel files of PBA
unit employees relating to and resulting from discipline
75 Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 21, §§90, R.943.
76 See Local Law No. 2 of 1986, Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 22, R. 948; Local Law 
No. of 1990, Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 23, R.955; Local Law No. 3 of 2002, 
Stipulated Record, Joint Exhibit 24, R. 959-960.
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initiated and imposed under procedures not in conformity 
with Article VIII of the parties’ agreement and Civil Service 
Law §75;
3. Rescind General Order No. 0-43 and not process any 
disciplinary actions pursuant to that General Order;
4. Sign, post and distribute the attached notice at all physical 
and electronic locations customarily used to post and 
distribute notices to unit employees.
DATED: August 23,2013 ~ ^  -------------
Albany, New York
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Schenectady, in the unit represented 
by the Schenectady Police Benevolent Association, that the City of Schenectady 
will:
1. Rescind any disciplinary action initiated against PBA unit members 
on or after November 30, 2007, to the extent that such disciplinary 
action was not in conformity with Article VIII of the parties’ 
agreement and Civil Service Law §75, and will make such PBA unit 
members whole including reinstatement with back wages and 
benefits with interest at the maximum legal rate;
2. Remove any documents from the personnel files of PBA unit
___ employees relating to and resulting from discipline initiated and___
imposed under procedures not in conformity with Article VIII of the 
parties’ agreement and Civil Service Law §75;
3. Rescind General Order No. 0-43 and not process any disciplinary 
actions pursuant to that General Order.
Dated r ^  . v -----------------------By ........................................ .............. . . . .-------
on behalf of the City of Schenectady
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
